There are two possible scenarios for the end of the war in Ukraine, according to Alexey Kopytko.
I am eagerly anticipating the middle of next week. Events are set to unfold that will allow for some clarity to emerge.
For now, let's touch on universal human issues.
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The new administration is already compelled to investigate two aviation disasters: the F-35 crash in Alaska and a collision between a civilian airplane and a helicopter right in Washington. HAMAS is gradually releasing hostages...
What does this lead to? It leads to the need to remain focused on the facts to avoid getting overwhelmed.
1) The level of internal obscurantism in Ukraine is rising;
2) A pause in non-military foreign aid is not dramatically worsening the situation yet, but it is deteriorating;
3) In the US, a new head of the Pentagon has been appointed with great difficulty. Many doubted that the appointment would even happen. This is relevant for us because the Pentagon chief will coordinate international military assistance. At a MINIMUM, they will grant permission for the supply/use of a whole range of formally non-American weapons. If they revoke these permissions, the ban from USAID will seem like a minor misunderstanding.
4) It has been 3 weeks since the last military aid package was issued under the authority of the US president (PDA). To maintain momentum, some new format must be indicated within 2 weeks. I wouldn't rule out that everything will continue as is, just without extra announcements.
5) The pace of the Russian army's advance is slowing – this is indicated by both official data and reasonable experts. The situation remains very difficult, with alarming developments in the Kharkiv region; the Russians are slowly pushing forward, littering the ground with their dead. But they are slowing down.
Against this backdrop, a "track" is being aggressively laid in the public space, steering the entire discourse. We are talking about two scenarios: "the good way" – a ceasefire within 100 days, and "the bad way" – failure of initial contacts leading to another six-month cycle of war.
The material basis for a theoretical (!) ceasefire in "100 days" is solely: the loss of Russia's ability to exert pressure on the front. No means, no ends.
The tools available to the US will not yield results within 100 days, only in the "bad way" scenario. That is, for a short period, they will attempt to negotiate through the THREAT of using these tools. And the threat is a matter of belief.
If the Russians find a way to replenish their troops with biomass without announcing a new wave of mass mobilization (for example, GUR stated that the Russians plan to recruit 10,000 prisoners, debtors, etc. each month), they will continue to apply pressure, without options.
Does this mean we will inevitably enter a new six-month cycle? There is a nuance.
The Kremlin's decisions will be dictated by the following:
1) Will the Kremlin believe that the US will fully utilize its levers (because it would hurt);
2) How will the Kremlin assess the US's ability to IMPLEMENT threats, as this is two very different things;
3) How will the Kremlin evaluate the likelihood of Ukraine collapsing from within;
4) How will the Kremlin assess the prospects for support of Ukraine (speed, rhythm, scale) from partners for the second half of 2025.
In Moscow, they surely have a sober assessment that if a new six-month cycle of war begins, the US could significantly harm Russia. Additionally, the volume of technological problems (ships, planes, all types of infrastructure) is growing within Russia. This poses a threat of a chain reaction.
Entering a new cycle and incurring colossal damage is rational only if Moscow is confident in its ability to collapse Ukraine during the hot phase of the war. In that case, the prize compensates for all losses.
This represents the main elements of the puzzle, which give insight when assembled based on the "if/then" principle.
If: 1) Ukraine does not collapse; 2) the Russian authorities do not find a way to increase supply of troops to the front without forced mass mobilization; 3) the US proves its readiness to tighten the screws on Russia and does not contribute to Ukraine's collapse with its actions; 4) a reasonable dialogue about support for Ukraine in the second half of 2025 begins, then the chances of a ceasefire by summer increase.
For Russia, this is an unfavorable scenario, because the Kremlin is clearly counting on a more significant prize in the form of dismantling Ukrainian statehood. Otherwise, what's the point? Just for the ruins of Bakhmut and Volchansk?
Therefore, while maintaining the main track – the continuation of war, the Kremlin publicly IMITATES the intention to negotiate while simultaneously preparing to turn us into minced meat through a combination of military and non-military methods.
This backup track includes several elements.
One of them is a provocation of chaos during the elections in Ukraine, which could theoretically take place after a ceasefire. The Russians are preparing for our hypothetical elections almost more actively than local deviants from various camps.
The second element is related to the activity of Russia abroad. The logic is roughly this: Everyone is for peace, right? To initiate the process, one must outline steps aimed at strengthening mutual trust. Loosen the screws a bit. Non-military, humanitarian. Restore some connections.
It is clear that no one will lift sanctions against Russian military factories. However, they will be eager to revive professional contacts in science, education, culture, art, etc.
And there is a reason – the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazism and Japanese militarism, the celebration of which will stretch until September (!).
Hordes of European and American sympathizers of Russia are already mumbling that dialogue should somehow be unblocked. Recently, the President of Brazil stated he would participate in events on May 9 in Moscow. And he is far from the last.
We must be morally prepared for the fact that starting this spring, the floodgates will gradually open, and a wave of Russians will descend upon the West. There will also be an organized counter-flow to Russia. People with sensitive souls should already be psychologically prepared for scenes of brotherhood between Europeans and Americans with Russians based on sectoral principles.
The Kremlin is not composed of fools. They will not immediately push some conditional Skabeeva onto the West. No ideology, minimal politics. The main message: let’s take the "conflict" off the table and restore professional connections. Let physicists and mathematicians discuss their subjects, let symphonic orchestras tour, let museums mutually display Impressionists, etc.
Objectively, the situation is this: there are many more people in Russia than in Ukraine who can travel to the West and speak knowledgeably about mathematics/physics/Tchaikovsky/"War and Peace".
If the process of restoring these connections is initiated, there will be an emotional uplift, a sense of lost time due to the "conflict", etc. Consequently, all of this will be channeled into disrupting any forms of support for Ukraine starting in the second half of 2025.
This is yet another tiny aspect of the suspension of American grants.
Despicable grants helped people survive who are not funded by the Ukrainian state. All these unfortunate scholars, educators, and cultural figures who will never become commercial, etc. By participating in conferences like "Transgenders and Mathematical Analysis", some specialists maintained the ability to eat, pay utilities, and engage in that very mathematical analysis. Some even received funding for trips abroad, maintaining contacts.
If in the next six months, there are noticeably more Russians in decent countries, and fewer of our people than before – we will feel this not in the cultural/scientific sphere..., but in defense.
Therefore, I sincerely hope that the statement to compensate at least part of the lost aid through the state will be backed by action. Because specifically this year (!) even visits by puppet theaters abroad will play a role in defense.
If 1) discord increases within Ukraine, 2) the Americans engage in something vague, 3) the Europeans get bogged down in their problems, then the chances for a ceasefire will sharply decrease, as the Kremlin will maintain faith in the main plan and prepare to endure at least until the end of 2025.
The situation is far from hopeless. But it requires utmost concentration and dedication. Starting with the main thing: do not create nonsense.
Even in the current situation (given the volume of known problems), the army is slowing down the Russians, drones are "imposing sanctions". February is ahead. A cold snap is expected. This will be a test for everyone. The Russians will surely try to disrupt the energy system at the peak of the frost, but the effectiveness of their attacks has sharply decreased. Plus, they will traditionally face a multitude